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A MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR STOCHASTIC
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION
TA THI KIEU AN AND BERNT ØKSENDAL
Abstract. In this paper we first deal with the problem of optimal con-
trol for zero-sum stochastic differential games. We give a necessary and
sufficient maximum principle for that problem with partial information.
Then we use the result to solve a problem in finance. Finally, we extend
our approach to general stochastic games (nonzero-sum), and obtain an
equilibrium point of such game.
1. Introduction
Game theory had been an active area of research and a useful tool in
many applications, particularly in biology and economic. In the recent pa-
per by Mataramvura and Øksendal [6], the stochastic differential game was
solved with restriction to consider only Markov controls. Then the equilib-
rium point or other type of solution are constructed using Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations. In this paper, we require that the control process
is adapted to a given sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the un-
derlying Le´vy processes. So we cannot use dynamic programming and HJB
equations to solve the problems. Here we establish a maximum principle for
such stochastic control problems. There is already a lot of literature on the
maximum principle. See e.g. [1], [2], [5], [9] and the references therein.
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give a sufficient maxi-
mum principle for zero-sum stochastic differential games (Theorem 1). And
a necessary type of this problem is given in the section 3. In section 4 we
put a problem in finance into the framework of a stochastic differential game
with partial information and use Theorem 1 to solve it. With complete in-
formation this problem is solved in [8] by using HJB equations. In section 4
we generalize our approach to the general case, not necessarily of zero-sum
type, and also give an equilibrium point for nonzero-sum games.
2. The sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum games
Suppose the dynamics of a stochastic system is described by a stochastic
differential equation on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P)
of the form
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
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t))dB(t)
+
∫
Rn γ(t,X(t
−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜( dt, dz), t ∈ [0, T ]
X(0) = x ∈ Rn
(2.1)
Here b : [0, T ] × Rn × K → Rn; σ : [0, T ] × Rn × K → Rn×n and γ :
[0, T ]×Rn×K ×R0 → Rn×n are given continuous functions, and B(t) is n-
dimensional Brownian motion, N˜(., .) are n independent compensated Pois-
son random measures and K is a given closed subset of Rn. The processes
u0(t) = u0(t, ω) and u1(t) = u1(t, z, ω), ω ∈ Ω are our control processes. We
assume that u0(t), u1(t, z) have values in a given set K for a.a. t, z and that
u0(t), u1(t, z) are ca`dla`g and adapted to a given filtration {Et}t≥0, where
Et ⊆ Ft, t ≥ 0
For example, we could have
Et = F(t−δ)+ ; t ≥ 0
where (t− δ)+ = max(0, t− δ). This models a situation where the controller
only has delayed information available about the state of the system.
Let f : [0, T ]× Rn ×K → R be a continuous function, namely the profit
rate, and let g : Rn → R be a concave function, namely the bequest function.
We call u = (u0, u1) an admissible control if (2.1) has a unique strong
solution and
(2.2) Ex
[ ∫ T
0
| f(t,X(t), u0(t)) | dt+ | g(X(T )) |
]
<∞
If u is an admissible control we define the performance criterion J(u) by
(2.3) J(u) = Ex
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u0(t)) dt+ g(X(T ))
]
Now suppose that the controls u0(t) and u1(t, z) have the form
u0(t) = (θ0(t), pi0(t)); t ≥ 0(2.4)
u1(t, z) = (θ1(t, z), pi1(t, z)); (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)× Rn(2.5)
We let Θ and Π be given families of admissible controls θ = (θ0, θ1) and
pi = (pi0, pi1), respectively. The partial information zero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential game problem is to find (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ Θ×Π such that
(2.6) ΦE(x) = J(θ∗, pi∗) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
Such a control (θ∗, pi∗) is called an optimal control (if it exists).
The intuitive idea is that there are two players, I and II. Player I controls
θ := (θ0, θ1) and player II controls pi := (pi0, pi1). The actions of the players
are antagonistic, which means that between I and II there is a payoff J(θ, pi)
which is a cost for I and a reward for II.
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Let K1,K2 be two sets such that θ(t, z) ∈ K1 and pi(t, z) ∈ K2 for a.a
t, z. As in [5] we now define the Hamiltonian H : [0, T ] × Rn ×K1 ×K2 ×
Rn × Rn×n ×R → R by
H(t, x, θ, pi, p, q, r) =f(t, x, θ, pi) + bT (t, x, θ, pi)p+ tr(σT ((t, x, θ, pi)q)
+
n∑
i,j=1
∫
R0
γij(t, x, θ, pi, z)rij(t, z)νj(dzj)(2.7)
where R is the set of functions r : [0, T ] × R0 → Rn×n such that the in-
tegral in (2.7) converges. From now on we assume that H is continuously
differentiable with respect to x.
The adjoint equation in the unknown adapted processes p(t) ∈ Rn, q(t) ∈
Rn×n and r(t, s) ∈ Rn×n is the backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE)
(2.8)

dp(t) = −5x H(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, .)) dt
+q(t) dB(t) +
∫
Rn r(t
−, z)N˜( dt, dz), t < T
p(T ) = 5g(X(T ))
where 5yϕ(.) =
(
∂ϕ
∂y1
, ..., ∂ϕ∂yn
)T
is the gradient of ϕ : Rn → R with respect
to y = (y1, ..., yn).
We can now state the following verification theorem for optimality:
Theorem 1. Let (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ Θ × Π with corresponding state process Xˆ(t) =
X(θˆ,pˆi)(t). Denote by Xpi(t) and Xθ(t) to be X(θˆ,pi)(t) and X(θ,pˆi)(t), respec-
tively. Suppose there exists a solution (pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, z)) of the corresponding
adjoint equation (2.8) such that for all θ ∈ Θ and pi ∈ Π, we have
(2.9)
E
[ ∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))T{qˆqˆT (t)+∫
Rn
rˆrˆT (t, z)ν(dz)
}
(Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))dt
]
<∞
(2.10)
E
[ ∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(θ)(t))T{qˆqˆT (t)+∫
Rn
rˆrˆT (t, z)ν(dz)
}
(Xˆ(t)−X(θ)(t))dt
]
<∞,
and
E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆ(t)T
{
σσT (t,X(t), θ(t), pˆi(t))(2.11)
+
∫
R0
γγT (t,X(θ)(t), θ(t), pˆi(t), z)ν(dz)
}
p(t)dt
]
<∞,
E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆ(t)T
{
σσT (t,X(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))(2.12)
+
∫
R0
γγT (t,X(pi)(t), θ(t), pˆi(t), z)ν(dz)
}
p(t)dt
]
<∞,
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ensuring that the integrals with respect to B and the compensated small
jumps part indeed have zero mean. Moreover, suppose that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
the following partial information maximum principle holds:
inf
θ∈K1
E[H(t,X(t), θ, pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et]
= E[H(t,X(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et](2.13)
= sup
pi∈K2
E[H(t,X(t), θˆ(t), pi, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et]
i) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], g(x) is concave and
(x, pi) 7→ H(t, x, θˆ(t), pi, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
is concave. Then
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ J(θˆ, pi) for all pi ∈ Π
and
J(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈Π
J(θˆ, pi)
ii) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], g(x) is convex and
(x, θ) 7→ H(t, x, θ, pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
is convex. Then
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ J(θ, pˆi) for all θ ∈ Θ
and
J(θˆ, pˆi) = inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pˆi)
iii) If both cases (i) and (ii) hold (which implies, in particular, that g is
an affine function), then (θ∗, pi∗) := (θˆ, pˆi) is an optimal control and
(2.14) ΦE(x) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
= inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
J(θ, pi)
)
Proof. i) Suppose (i) holds. Choose (θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π. Let us consider
J(θˆ, pˆi)− J(θˆ, pi) = I1 + I2
where
(2.15) I1 = E
[ ∫ T
0
{
f(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− f(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}dt]
and
(2.16) I2 = E
[
g(Xˆ(T ))− g(X(pi)(T ))
]
Since g is concave in x and from integration by parts formula for jump
processes we get the following, where the L2 conditions (2.9) and (2.12)
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ensure that the stochastic integrals with respect to the local martingales
have zero expectation:
I2 = E
[
g(Xˆ(T ))− g(X(pi)(T ))
]
≥ E
[
(Xˆ(T )−X(pi)(T ))T 5 g(Xˆ(T ))
]
= E
[
(X(θˆ,pˆi)(T )−X(θˆ,pi)(T ))T pˆ(T )
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t−)−X(pi)(t−))Tdpˆ(t) +
∫ T
0
pˆT (t)(dXˆ(t)− dX(pi)(t))
+
∫ T
0
tr
[
{σ(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− σ(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}T qˆ(t)
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∫
R0
{γij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), z)
− γij(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), z)}rˆij(t, z)ν(dzj)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))T (−5x H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)))dt
+
∫ T
0
pˆT (t)
{
b(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− b(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}dt
+
∫ T
0
tr
[
{σ(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− σ(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}T qˆ(t)
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∫
R0
{γij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), z)
− γij(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), z)}rˆij(t, z)ν(dzj)dt
](2.17)
By the definition (2.7) of H we have
I1 = E
[ ∫ T
0
{f(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− f(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
−H(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))}dt
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆT (t)
{
b(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− b(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}dt]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
tr
[{σ(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− σ(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}T qˆ(t)]dt]
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− E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∫
R0
{γij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), z)
− γij(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), z)}rˆij(t, z)ν(dzj)dt
](2.18)
By concavity of H in x and pi we have
H(t, Xˆ(t),θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))−H(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
≥ 5xH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))T (Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))
+5piH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))T (pˆi(t)− pi(t))(2.19)
Since pi → E[H(t,Xpi(t), θˆ(t), pi, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et] is maximum for pi =
pˆi(t) and pi(t), pˆi(t) are Et-measurable, we get
E
[5pi H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))T (pˆi(t)− pi(t)) | Et]
= (pˆi(t)− pi(t))5pi E
[
H(t,Xpi(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et
]T
pi=pˆi(t)
≥ 0
Combining this with (2.19) we obtain
E
[ ∫ T
0
{H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
−H(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))}dt
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
5xH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))T (Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))
](2.20)
Hence
I1 ≥E
[ ∫ T
0
5xH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))T (Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆT (t)
{
b(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− b(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}dt]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
tr
[{σ(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− σ(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))}T qˆ(t)]dt]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∫
R0
{γij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), z)
− γij(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), z)}rˆij(t, z)ν(dzj)dt
](2.21)
Adding (2.17), (2.21) above, we get
J(θˆ, pˆi)− J(θˆ, pi) = I1 + I2 ≥ 0(2.22)
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We therefore conclude that J(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ J(θˆ, pi) for all pi ∈ Π.
ii) Proceeding in the same way as in (i) we can show that J(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ J(θ, pˆi)
for all θ ∈ Θ if (ii) holds.
iii) If both (i) and (ii) hold then
J(θˆ, pi) ≤ J(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ J(θ, pˆi)
for any (θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π. Thereby
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pˆi) ≤ sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
On the other hand
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
J(θˆ, pi) ≥ inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
J(θ, pi)
)
Now due to the inequality
inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
J(θ, pi)
) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
we have
ΦE(x) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
= inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
J(θ, pi)
)

If the control process (θ, pi) is admissible adapted to the filtration Ft we
have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose Et = Ft for all t and that (2.9)-(2.12) hold. Moreover,
suppose that for all t the following maximum principle holds
inf
θ∈K1
H(t,X(t), θ, pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
= H(t,X(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))
= sup
pi∈K2
H(t,X(t), θˆ(t), pi, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))(2.23)
Then for all t ∈ [0, T ] we have
i) If g(x) is concave and (x, pi)→ H(t, x, θˆ(t), pi, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) is
concave, then
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ J(θˆ, pi) for all pi ∈ Π
and
J(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈Π
J(θˆ, pi)
ii) If g(x) is convex and (x, θ)→ H(t, x, θ, pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) is
convex, then
J(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ J(θ, pˆi) for all θ ∈ Θ
and
J(θˆ, pˆi) = inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pˆi)
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iii) If both cases (i) and (ii) hold, then (θ∗, pi∗) := (θˆ, pˆi) is an optimal
control based on the information flow Ft and
(2.24) ΦE(x) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, pi)
)
= inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
J(θ, pi)
)
3. A necessary maximum principle for Zero-sum games
In addition to the assumptions in Section 2 we now assume the following:
(A1) For all t, h such that 0 ≤ t < t+ h ≤ T , all bounded Et-measurable
α, ρ, and for s ∈ [0, T ] the controls β(s) := (0, ..., βi(s), ..., 0) and
η(s) := (0, ..., ηi(s), ..., 0), i = 1, ..., n with
βi(s) := αiχ[t,t+h](s), and ηi(s) := ρiχ[t,t+h](s)
belong to Θ and Π, respectively.
(A2) For given θ, β ∈ Θ and pi, η ∈ Π with β, η are bounded, there exists
δ > 0 such that
θ + yβ ∈ Θ, and pi + vη ∈ Π
where y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
Denote Xθ+yβ(t) = X(θ+yβ,pi)(t) and Xpi+vη(t) = X(θ,pi+vη)(t). For a given
θ, β ∈ Θ and pi, η ∈ Π with β, η bounded, we define the processes Y θ(t) and
Y pi(t) by
Y θ(t) =
d
dy
Xθ+yβ(t) |y=0= (Y θ1 (t), ..., Y θn (t))T(3.1)
Y pi(t) =
d
dv
Xpi+vη(t) |v=0= (Y pi1 (t), ..., Y pin (t))T(3.2)
We have that
(3.3) dY θi (t) = λ
θ
i (t)dt+
n∑
j=1
ξθij(t)dBj(t) +
n∑
j=1
∫
R
ζθij(t, z)N˜j(dt, dz),
and
(3.4) dY pii (t) = λ
pi
i (t)dt+
n∑
j=1
ξpiij(t)dBj(t) +
n∑
j=1
∫
R
ζpiij(t, z)N˜j(dt, dz),
where i = 1, ..., n and
(3.5)

λθi (t) = 5xbi(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY θ(t)
+5θ bi(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))Tβ(t)
ξθij(t) = 5xσij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY θ(t)
+5θ σij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))Tβ(t)
ζθij(t) = 5xγij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY θ(t)
+5θ γij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))Tβ(t)
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and
(3.6)

λpii (t) = 5xbi(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY pi(t)
+5pi bi(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))T η(t)
ξpiij(t) = 5xσij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY pi(t)
+5pi σij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))T η(t)
ζpiij(t) = 5xγij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))TY pi(t)
+5pi γij(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t))T η(t)
Theorem 3. Suppose (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ Θ×Π is a directional critical point for J(θ, pi),
in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ Θ and η ∈ Π there exist δ > 0 such
that θˆ + yβ ∈ Θ and pˆi + vη ∈ Π for all y ∈ (−δ, δ) and v ∈ (−δ, δ) and
h(y, v) := J(θˆ + yβ, pˆi + vη) y, v ∈ (−δ, δ)
has a critical point at (0, 0), i.e.
(3.7)
∂h
∂y
(0, 0) =
∂h
∂v
(0, 0) = 0.
Suppose there exists a solution pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .) of the associated adjoint
equation
(3.8)

dpˆ(t) = −5x H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) dt
+qˆ(t) dB(t) +
∫
Rn rˆ(t
−, z)N˜( dt, dz), t < T
pˆ(T ) = 5g(Xˆ(T ))
Moreover, suppose that if Y θˆ, Y pˆi, (λθˆi , ξ
θˆ
ij , ζ
θˆ
ij) and (λ
pˆi
i , ξ
pˆi
ij , ζ
pˆi
ij) are the cor-
responding coefficients (see (3.1)-(3.6)) then
E
[ ∫ T
0
Y θˆ
T
(t)
{
qˆqˆT +
∫
R
rˆrˆT (t, z)ν(dz)
}
Y θˆ(t)dt
]
<∞,(3.9)
E
[
Y pˆi
T
(t)
{
qˆqˆT +
∫
R
rˆrˆT (t, z)ν(dz)
}
Y pˆi(t)dt
]
<∞,(3.10)
and
E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆT (t)
{
ξθˆξθˆ
T
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))(3.11)
+
∫
R
γγT (t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))ν(dz)
}
pˆ(t)dt
]
<∞,
E
[ ∫ T
0
pˆT (t)
{
ξpˆiξpˆi
T
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))(3.12)
+
∫
R
γγT (t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))ν(dz)
}
pˆ(t)dt
]
<∞,
Then for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ], we have
E[5θ H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et]
= E[5piH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .)) | Et] = 0(3.13)
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Proof. Since h has a minimum at y = 0 we have
0 =
∂
∂y
h(y, 0) |y=0= E
[ ∫ T
0
5xf(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))T d
dy
X θˆ+yβ(t) |y=0 dt
+
∫ T
0
5θf(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))Tβ(t)dt+5g(Xˆ(T )T d
dy
X θˆ+yβ(T ) |y=0
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
5xf(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))TY θˆ(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
5θf(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))Tβ(t)dt+5g(Xˆ(T )TY θˆ(T )
](3.14)
By the Itoˆ formula,
E[5g(Xˆ(T )TY θˆ(T )] = E[pˆT (T )Y θˆ(T )]
= E
[ n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{
pˆi(t)(5xbi(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))TY θˆ(t)
+5θbi(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))Tβ(t))
+ Y θˆi (t)(−5x H(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))i
+
n∑
j=1
qˆij(t)(5xσij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))TY θˆ(t)
+5θσij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))Tβ(t))
+
n∑
j=1
∫
Rn
rˆij(t−, z)(5xγij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))TY θˆ(t)
+5θγij(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))Tβ(t))
}
dt
]
(3.15)
On the other hand,
5x H(t, x, θ, pi, p, q, r) = 5xf(t, x, θ, pi) +
n∑
i=1
5xbi(t, x, θ, pi)pi(3.16)
+
n∑
j,i=1
5xσji(t, x, θ, pi)qji +
n∑
j,i=1
∫
R
5xγji(t, x, θ, pi)rji(t, z)νj(dz)
Substituting this into (3.15) and combining with (3.14) we get
0 = E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
{ ∂f
∂θi
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))
+
n∑
j=1
(
pˆj(t)
∂bj
∂θi
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t)) +
n∑
k=1
[qˆkj(t)
∂σkj
∂θi
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))
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+
∫
R
rˆkj(t, z)
∂γkj
∂θi
(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))νj(dz)]
)
βi(t)
}
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
5θH(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, .))Tβ(t)dt
](3.17)
By assumption (A1), the equation (3.17) leads to
E
[ ∫ t+h
t
∂
∂θi
H(s, Xˆ(s), θˆ(s), pˆi(s), pˆ(s), qˆ(s), rˆ(s, .))αi(s)ds
]
= 0
Differentiating with respect to h at h = 0 gives
E
[ ∂
∂θi
H(s, Xˆ(s), θˆ(s), pˆi(s), pˆ(s), qˆ(s), rˆ(s, .))αi(s)
]
= 0
Since this holds for all bounded Et-measurable αi, we conclude that
E
[ ∂
∂θi
H(s, Xˆ(s), θˆ(s), pˆi(s), pˆ(s), qˆ(s), rˆ(s, .)) | Et
]
= 0,
as claimed.
Proceeding in the same way by differentiating the function h(0, v) with
respect to v we get
E
[ ∂
∂pii
H(s, Xˆ(s), θˆ(s), pˆi(s), pˆ(s), qˆ(s), rˆ(s, .)) | Et
]
= 0
This completes the proof. 
4. Applications to Finance
In this section, we will use our result to solve a partial information version
of the problem studied in [8].
Consider the following jump diffusion market:
(risky free asset) dS0(t) = ρ(t)S0(t)dt; S0(0) = 1(4.1)
(risky asset) dS1(t) = S1(t−)
[
α(t)dt+ β(t)dB(t)(4.2)
+
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; S1(0) > 0
where ρ(t) is a deterministic function, α(t), β(t) and γ(t, z) are given Ft-
predictable functions satisfying the following integrability condition:
E
[ ∫ T
0
{
| ρ(s) | + | α(s) | +1
2
β(s)2(4.3)
+
∫
R
| log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z) | ν(dz)
}
ds
]
<∞
where T is fixed. We assume that
(4.4) γ(t, z) ≥ −1 for a.a. t, z ∈ [0, T ]× R0
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where R0 = R\{0}. This model represents a natural generalization of the
classical Black-Scholes market model to the case where the coefficients are
not necessarily constants, but allowed to be (predictable) stochastic pro-
cesses. Moreover, we have added a jump component. See e.g. [3] or [7] for
discussions of such markets.
Let Et ⊆ Ft be a given sub-filtration. Let pi(t) be a portfolio, which is Et-
measurable random variable and represented by the fraction of the wealth
invested in the risky asset at time t. The the dynamics of the corresponding
wealth process V (pi)(t) is
(4.5)

dV (pi)(t) = V (pi)(t−)
[
{ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi(t)}dt
+pi(t)β(t)dB(t) + pi(t−)
∫
R γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
V (pi)(0) = v > 0.
A portfolio pi is called admissible if it is a measurable ca`dla`g stochastic
process adapted to filtration Et and satisfies
pi(t−)γ(t, z) > −1 a.s.
and ∫ T
0
{
| ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi(t) | +pi2(t)β2(t)(4.6)
+ pi2(t)
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt <∞ a.s.
The requirement that pi should be adapted to the filtration Et is a mathe-
matical way of requiring that the choice of the portfolio value pi(t) at time
t is allowed to depend on the information (σ-algebra) Et only. The wealth
process corresponding to an admissible portfolio pi is the solution of (4.5):
V (pi)(t) = v exp
[ ∫ t
0
{ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi(t)− 1
2
pi2(t)β2(t)
+
∫
R
(ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))− pi(z)γ(s, z))ν(dz)}ds
+
∫ t
0
pi(s)β(s)dB(s) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)
]
(4.7)
The family of admissible portfolios is denoted by Π.
Now we introduce a family Q of measures Qθ parameterized by processes
θ = (θ0(t), θ1(t, z)) such that
(4.8) dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) on FT ,
where
(4.9)
{
dZθ(t) = Zθ(t−)[−θ0(t)dB(t)−
∫
R θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)]
Zθ(0) = 1
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We assume that θ1(t, z) ≤ 1 for a.a. t,z and
(4.10)
∫ T
0
{
θ20(s) +
∫
R
θ21(s, z)
}
ds <∞ a.s.
Then by the Itoˆ formula the solution of (4.9) is given by
Zθ(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 12
∫ t
0
θ20(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
ln(1− θ1(s, z))N˜(dt, dz)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
{ln(1− θ1(s, z)) + θ1(s, z)}ν(dz)ds
]
(4.11)
If θ = (θ0(t), θ1(t, z)) satisfy
(4.12) E[Zθ(T )] = 1
then Qθ is a probability measure.
If, in addition
(4.13) β(t)θ0(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)θ1(t, z)ν(dz) = α(t)− r(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
then dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) is an equivalent local martingale measure. See
e.g. [7], Ch.1. But here we do not assume (4.13) holds.
For all θ = (θ0, θ1) adapted to sub-filtration Et and satisfies (4.10)-(4.12) is
called admissible controls of the market. The families of admissible controls
θ is denoted by Θ.
The problem is to find (θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π such that
(4.14) inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
EQθ [U(X
pi(T ))]
)
= EQθ∗ [U(X
pi∗(T ))]
where U : [0,∞)→ [−∞,∞) is a given utility function, which is increasing,
concave and twice continuously differentiable on (0,∞).
We can consider this problem as a stochastic differential game between the
agent and themarket. The agent wants to maximize her expected discounted
utility over all portfolios pi and the market wants to minimize the maximal
expected utility of the representative agent over all “scenarios”, represented
by all probability measures Qθ; θ ∈ Θ.
To put this problem into the Markovian context discussed in the previ-
ous sections we combine the Radon-Nikodym process Zθ(t) and the wealth
process V (pi)(t) into a 2-dimensional state process X(t), as follows:
Put
dX(t) =
[
dX1(t)
dX2(t)
]
=
[
dZθ(t)
dV (pi)(t)
]
=
[
0
V (pi)(t−){ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi}
]
dt
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+
[ −Zθ(t−)θ0(t)
V (pi)(t−)β(t)pi(t)
]
dB(t) +
[ −Zθ(t−) ∫R θ1(t, z)
V (pi)(t−)pi(t)
∫
R γ(t, z)
]
N˜(dt, dz)
(4.15)
To solve this problem we first write down the Hamiltonian function
H(t, x1, x2, θ, pi, p, q, r) = x2{ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi(t)}p2 − x1θ0q1
(4.16)
+ x2β(t)pi(t)q2 +
∫
R
{−x1θ1(t, z)r1(t, z) + x2pi(t)γ(t, z)r2(t, z)}ν(dz)
The adjoint equations are
(4.17)
dp1(t) =
(
θ0(t)q1(t) +
∫
R θ1(t, z)r1(t, z)ν(dz)
)
dt+ q1(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R r1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
p1(T ) = Ox1U(X2(T ))
and
(4.18)
dp2(t) = −
[
{ρ(t) + (α(t)− ρ(t))pi(t)}p2(t) + β(t)pi(t)q2(t)
+
∫
R pi(t)γ(t, z)r2(t, z)ν(dz)
]
dt+ q2(t)dB(t) +
∫
R r2(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
p2(T ) = Ox2U(X2(T ))
Let (θˆ, pˆi) be candidate for an optimal control and let Xˆ(t) = (Xˆ1(t), Xˆ2(t))
be the corresponding optimal processes with corresponding solution pˆ(t) =
(pˆ1(t), pˆ2(t)), qˆ(t) = (qˆ1(t), qˆ2(t)), rˆ(t, .) = (rˆ1(t, .), rˆ2(t, .)) of the adjoint
equations.
We first maximize the Hamiltonian E[H(t, x1, x2, θ, pi, p, q, r) | Et] over all
pi ∈ K2. This gives the following condition for a maximum point pˆi:
E[(α(t)− ρ(t))pˆ2(t) | Et] + E[β(t)qˆ2(t) | Et](4.19)
+
∫
R
γ(t, z)E[γ(t, z)rˆ2(t, z) | Et]ν(dz) = 0
And then we minimize E[H(t, x1, x2, θ, pi, p, q, r) | Et] over all θ ∈ K1 and
get the following conditions for a minimum point θˆ = (θ0, θ1)
(4.20) E[−Xˆ1(t)qˆ1(t) | Et] = 0
and
(4.21)
∫
R
E[−Xˆ1(t)rˆ1(t, z) | Et]ν(dz) = 0
We try a process pˆ1(t) of the form
(4.22) pˆ1(t) = U(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
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with f is a deterministic differentiable function. Differentiating (4.22) and
using (4.5) we get
dpˆ1(t) = f
′
(t)Xˆ2(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dt
+ Xˆ2(t)[(ρ(t)− (α(t)− ρ(t))pˆi(t))dt+ β(t)pˆi(t)dB(t)]f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+
1
2
f2(t)Xˆ22 (t)β
2(t)pi2(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dt
+
∫
R
{U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t)))
− Xˆ2(t)pˆi(t)γ(t, z)f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))}ν(dz)dt
+
∫
R
{U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t)))}N˜(dt, dz)
=
{
f
′
(t)Xˆ2(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) +
1
2
f2(t)Xˆ22 (t)β
2(t)pi2(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+ Xˆ2(t)(ρ(t)− (α(t)− ρ(t))pˆi(t))f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+
∫
R
{U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t)))
− Xˆ2(t)pˆi(t)γ(t, z)f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))}ν(dz)
}
dt
+ Xˆ2(t)β(t)pˆi(t)f(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
{U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t)))}N˜(dt, dz)
Comparing this with (4.17) by equating the dt, dB(t) and N˜(dt, dz) coeffi-
cients respectively, we get
qˆ1(t) = Xˆ2(t)β(t)pˆi(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(4.23)
rˆ1(t, z) = U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z)))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(4.24)
and
f
′
(t)Xˆ2(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) +
1
2
Xˆ22 (t)β
2(t)pi2(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+ Xˆ2(t)(ρ(t)− (α(t)− ρ(t))pˆi(t))f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+
∫
R
{U(Xˆ2(t)(f(t) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))− U(f(t)Xˆ2(t)))
− Xˆ2(t)pˆi(t)γ(t, z)f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))}ν(dz)
= θˆ0(t)qˆ1(t) +
∫
R
θˆ1(t, z)rˆ1(t, z)ν(dz)(4.25)
Substituting (4.23) into (4.20) we get
(4.26) −pˆi(t)E[Xˆ1(t)Xˆ2(t)β(t)U ′′(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) | Et] = 0
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or
(4.27) pˆi(t) = 0
Now we try the process pˆ2(t) of the form
(4.28) pˆ2(t) = Xˆ1(t)f(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
Differentiating (4.28) and using (4.27) we get
dpˆ2(t) = f
′
(t)Xˆ1(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dt+ f(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dXˆ1(t)
+ f(t)Xˆ1(t)dU
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
= Xˆ1(t)
(
f
′
(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) + f(t)f
′
(t)Xˆ2(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
+ f2(t)Xˆ2(t)ρ(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
)
dt
− f(t)Xˆ1(t)θ0(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))dB(t)
−
∫
R
f(t)Xˆ1(t)θ1(t, z)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))N˜(dt, dz)(4.29)
Compare this with (4.18) we get
qˆ2(t) = −f(t)Xˆ1(t)θ0(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(4.30)
rˆ2(t, z) = −f(t)Xˆ1(t)θ1(t, z)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(4.31)
and
f
′
(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) + f(t)Xˆ2(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(f
′
(t) + f(t)ρ(t))
= −ρ(t)f(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t))(4.32)
Substituting (4.30), (4.31) into (4.19) we get
E[(α(t)− ρ(t))f(t)Xˆ1(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) | Et]
− θ0(t)E[β(t)f(t)Xˆ1(t)U ′(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) | Et]
−
∫
R
θ1(t, z)E[γ(t, z)f(t)Xˆ1(t)U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) | Et] = 0(4.33)
This can be written as
θˆ0(t)E[β(t) | Et]−
∫
R
θˆ1(t, z)E[γ(t, z) | Et]ν(dz) = E[α(t) | Et]− ρ(t)
(4.34)
From (4.32) we get
(4.35)
(
U
′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t)) + Xˆ2(t)f(t)U
′′
(f(t)Xˆ2(t))
)
(f
′
(t) + r(t)f(t)) = 0
or
(4.36) f
′
(t) + r(t)f(t) = 0
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i.e.
(4.37) f(t) = exp
(∫ T
t
r(s)ds
)
We have proved:
Theorem 4. The optimal portfolio pi ∈ Π for the agent is
(4.38) pi(t) = pˆi(t) = 0
and the optimal measure Qθˆ for the market is to choose θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1) such
that
θˆ0(t)E[β(t) | Et]−
∫
R
θˆ1(t, z)E[γ(t, z) | Et]ν(dz) = E[α(t) | Et]− ρ(t)
(4.39)
Remark. In the case when Et = Ft for all t, this was proved in [8]. In
this case the interpretation of this result is the following: The market min-
imizes the maximal expected utility of the agent by choosing a “scenario”
(represented by a probability law dQθ = Zθ(T )dP ) which is an equivalent
martingale measure for the market (see (4.13)). In this case the optimal
strategy for the agent is to place all the money in the risk free asset, i.e. to
choose pi(t) = 0 for all t. Theorem 4 states that an analogue result holds also
in the case when both players have only partial information Et ⊆ Ft to their
disposal, but now the coefficients β(t), γ(t, z) and α(t) must be replaced
their conditional expectations E[β(t) | Et], E[γ(t, z) | Et] and E[α(t) | Et].
5. The sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum game
Let X(t) be a stochastic process describing the state of the system. We
now consider the case when two controllers I and II intervene on the dy-
namics of the system and their advantages are not necessarily antagonistic
but each one acts such as to save her own interest. This situation is a
nonzero-sum game.
Let E1t , E2t be filtrations satisfying
E it ⊆ Ft, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2
Let u = (θ, pi), where θ = (θ0, θ1) and pi = (pi0, pi1) are controls for
player I and II, respectively. We assume that θ = (θ0, θ1) are adapted to
E1t and pi = (pi0, pi1) are adapted to E2t . Denote by Θ and Π the sets of
admissible controls θ and pi, respectively. Suppose the players act on the
system with strategy (θ, pi) ∈ Θ × Π, then the costs associated with I and
II are, respectively, J (θ,pi)1 (x) and J
(θ,pi)
2 (x) of the form
(5.1) Ji(θ, pi) = Ex
[ ∫ T
0
fi(t,X(t), u(t)) dt+ gi(X(T ))
]
, i = 1, 2.
The problem is to find a control (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ Θ×Π such that
J1(θ, pi∗) ≤ J1(θ∗, pi∗) for all θ ∈ Θ(5.2)
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J2(θ∗, pi) ≤ J2(θ∗, pi∗) for all pi ∈ Π(5.3)
The pair of controls (θ∗, pi∗) is called a Nash equilibrium point for the game
because when player I (resp. II) acts with the strategy θ∗ (resp. pi∗), the
best that II (resp. I) can do is to act with pi∗ (resp. θ∗).
Let us introduce the Hamiltonian functions associated with this game,
namely H1 and H2, from [0, T ]×Rn×K1×K2×Rn×Rn×m×R to R which
are defined by
Hi(t, x, θ, pi, pi, qi, ri) = fi(t, x, θ, pi) + bᵀ(t, x, θ, pi)pi + tr(σᵀ((t, x, θ, pi)qi)
+
n∑
k,j=1
∫
R0
γkj(t, x, θ, pi, z)rikj(t, z)νj(dzj), i = 1, 2.(5.4)
And we also have the adjoint equations for the game, as follows
(5.5)

dpi(t) = −5x Hi(t,X(t), θ(t), pi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, .))dt
+qi(t)dB(t) +
∫
Rn r
i(t−, z)N˜(dt, dz), t < T
pi(T ) = 5gi(X(T )), i = 1, 2.
The following result is a generalization of Theorem 1:
Theorem 5. Let (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ Θ × Π with corresponding state process Xˆ(t) =
X(θˆ,pˆi)(t). Suppose there exists a solution (pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, z)), i = 1, 2 of the
corresponding adjoint equation (5.5) such that for all θ ∈ Θ and pi ∈ Π, we
have
E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .)) | E1t ]
≥ E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .)) | E1t ](5.6)
and
E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, .)) | E2t ]
≥ E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, .)) | E2t ](5.7)
Moreover, suppose that for all t ∈ [0, T ], Hi(t, x, θ, pi, pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, .)),
i = 1, 2, is concave in x, θ, pi and gi(x), i = 1, 2, is concave in x. Then
(θˆ(t), pˆi(t)) is a Nash equilibrium point for the game and
J1(θˆ, pˆi) = supθ∈Θ J1(θ, pˆi)(5.8)
J2(θˆ, pˆi) = suppi∈Π J2(θˆ, pi)(5.9)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1 we have
J1(θˆ, pˆi)− J1(θ, pˆi)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{
f1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t))− f1(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t))
}
dt
+ g1(Xˆ(T ))− g1(X(pi)(T ))
]
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= E
[ ∫ T
0
{
H1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .))
−H1(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .))
−5xH1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .)))(Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))T
}
dt
](5.10)
From (5.6) and concavity of H1 in x and pi we have
E
[ ∫ T
0
{H1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .))
−H1(t,X(pi)(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .))}dt
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
5xH1(t, Xˆ(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, .))(Xˆ(t)−X(pi)(t))Tdt
](5.11)
Hence
(5.12) J1(θˆ, pˆi)− J1(θ, pˆi) ≥ 0
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ we have
(5.13) J1(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
θ∈Θ
J1(θ, pˆi)
In the same way we show that
J2(θ∗, pi) ≤ J2(θ∗, pi∗)
and
J2(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈pi
J2(θˆ, pi),
whence the desired result. 
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